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Abstract Abating the threat climate change poses to the lives of future
people clearly challenges our development models. The 2011 Human Devel-
opment Report rightly focuses on the integral links between sustainability
and equity. However, the human development and capabilities approach
emphasizes the expansion of people’s capabilities simpliciter, which is ques-
tionable in view of environmental sustainability. We argue that capabilities
should be defined as triadic relations between an agent, constraints and poss-
ible functionings. This triadic syntax particularly applies to climate change:
since people’s lives and capabilities are dependent on the environment, sus-
tainable human development should also include constraining human activi-
ties in order to prevent losses in future people’s well-being due to the
adverse effects of exacerbated climate change. On this basis, we will advocate
that the goals of sustainable human development should be informed by a fra-
mework that consists of enhancing capabilities up to a threshold level, as well
as constraining the functionings beyond this threshold in terms of their green-
house gas emissions.
Key words: Sustainable human development, 2011 Human Development
Report, Capabilities, Climate change
Introduction
Neumayer notes that the literatures on human development and sustainable
development have long been separate, which is surprising because ‘on a
very fundamental level, human development is what sustainability propo-
nents want to sustain and without sustainability, human development is not
true human development’ (2010, p. 1). This has changed with the introduc-
tion of the Human Development Reports (HDRs) by the United Nations
Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 2013
Vol. 14, No. 1, 58–76, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2012.748019
# 2013 Human Development and Capability Association
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [W
ou
ter
 Pe
ete
rs]
 at
 02
:59
 28
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
13
 
Development Programme (UNDP). The concept of ‘sustainable human devel-
opment’ (SHD) gained real prominence in the 1994 HDR, which argued that
there is no tension between human development and sustainability, because
both are essential components of the universality of life claims, which ‘is
the common thread that binds the demands of human development today
with the exigencies of development tomorrow’ (UNDP, 1994, p. 13). The
2007/08 HDR argues that climate change affects all people in all countries,
but the world’s poorest are the most vulnerable to its harmful effects
(UNDP, 2007, p. 21). Together with the history of emissions accumulation
and distribution, this points to an inverse relationship between climate
change vulnerability and responsibility (2007, p. 43). The 2010 HDR reiterates
the centrality of ethical universalism, arguing that SHD is about making sure
that present as well as future people can lead healthy, educated and fulfilling
lives: ‘human development, if not sustainable, is not true human develop-
ment’ (UNDP, 2010, p. 19). The 2011 HDR highlights the integral links
between the closely related challenges of environmental sustainability and
equity (UNDP, 2011, p. 13).
Environmental sustainability relates to ‘the need to operate within the
ecological carrying capacity of the earth’ (Ross, 2009, p. 38). In order to
avoid unacceptable environmental change and maintain the biophysical pre-
conditions for human development, human activities should not transgress
certain ‘planetary boundaries’ (Rockstro¨m et al., 2009, p. 472).1 Hence,
environmental sustainability should be at the core of SHD—which is acknowl-
edged by the 2011 HDR (UNDP, 2011, p. 16). Thus, the social goal of enhan-
cing people’s capabilities and well-being should be situated within the
biophysical constraints of the ecosphere.
Although it is not the only environmental threat, we focus on climate
change for two important reasons. First, ‘climate change represents one of
the most serious and far-reaching challenges facing humankind in the
twenty-first Century’, because the economic, social, human and environ-
mental costs of inaction are likely to be extremely high (Byers et al., 2005,
p. 1). Hence, climate change mitigation should be regarded as a central
concern of SHD.2 Keeping the most likely global warming due to greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions to 28C above pre-industrial levels will require us to limit
cumulative GHG emissions over the entire ‘Anthropocene’ (Allen et al., 2009,
p. 56). The adverse effects of unmitigated human-induced climate change thus
clearly illustrate the need for taking the biophysical constraints of the eco-
sphere seriously—in this case, the maximum permissible budget of total net
GHG emissions.3 Second, GHG emission rates continue to increase with a
rising Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2011, p. 30). Although the
resulting environmental cost is mainly attributable to economic growth, it is
clear that the efforts needed to mitigate climate change challenge our develop-
ment models.
We welcome the focus of the 2011 HDR on the links between sustainabil-
ity and equity. However, the question addressed in this paper is whether the
account developed by the 2011 HDR—and more broadly, by the human
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development and capabilities (HDC) approach4—meets these requirements
of environmental sustainability. We will argue that the HDC approach
cannot adequately scrutinize the share of material progress in its model of
development, due to some ambiguities in its theoretical underpinnings. Sub-
sequently, we will argue that capabilities need to be conceptualized as
triadic relations between an agent, constraints and possible functionings.
Building on recent debates in the literature, we suggest that this triadic
syntax demonstrates that there is a strong moral reason to constrain human
activities in order to prevent losses in future people’s well-being due to the
aggravated adverse effects of unmitigated climate change. In the fourth
section we will therefore advocate that the goals of SHD should include the
expansion of people’s freedoms and capabilities up to a threshold level, as
well as constraining people’s functioning combinations in terms of their
GHG emissions.
The 2011 HDR: integral links between equity and sustainability
The 2011 HDR sets out by stating that the past progress rates of human devel-
opment might not continue because conditions regarding the two key dimen-
sions of environmental sustainability and equity have deteriorated (UNDP,
2011, p. 13). Therefore, the main issues are ‘the adverse repercussions for
human development of the lack of environmental sustainability. . .and more
positively, the intersections between greater sustainability and equity, as
well as the potential for progressive reforms that promote both goals’
(2011, p. 19). Considering equity and sustainability jointly does not mean
that they are mutually reinforcing in all instances, but compels us to identify
positive synergies between the two and to give special consideration to the
trade-offs.
This account is explicitly based on the universality of life claims: ‘the rec-
ognition of a shared claim to the basic capability to lead worthwhile lives’
(Anand and Sen, 1994, p. 4). While the uncertainty about future people’s capa-
bilities led earlier positions (for example, Anand and Sen, 1994, pp. 27–28;
UNDP, 1994, p. 18) to assume the feasibility of the substitutability of environ-
mental by human capital, the 2011 HDR by contrast argues that this uncer-
tainty requires protecting the availability and diversity of natural resources
(UNDP, 2011, p. 14). In view of the detrimental impacts of anthropogenic
climate change, the 2011 HDR forcefully states that ‘the message is clear:
our development model is bumping up against concrete limits’ (2011, p. 15).
We endorse the 2011 HDR’s emphasis on the integral links between
equity and sustainability, as well as its concerns regarding climate change
within the framework of ethical universalism. Nonetheless, some ambiguities
remain in its account of SHD. The 2011 HDR criticizes sustainability perspec-
tives, noting that, in general, they do not adequately capture SHD: ‘they do
not refer to the expansion of choice, freedoms and capabilities intrinsic to
human development’ (UNDP, 2011, p. 17). Many of these accounts allegedly
view equity and the plight to the poor as separate and unrelated issues
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(2011, p. 19). While this critique is to a certain extent valid, the pendulum
should not swing too far the other way: an account of SHD must also
avoid the risk of overemphasizing human development at the cost of
sustainability.
Consider the HDC approach’s treatment of the income dimension. On
the one hand, it heavily criticizes the opulence-oriented view of development
for being an insufficient basis for human development: freedom also depends
on other determinants—such as social arrangements and political and civil lib-
erties (Sen, 1999, p. 3; UNDP, 2010, p. 40). The HDC approach substantiates
its model of development accordingly, incorporating health and education
together with income. Moreover, the 2011 HDR criticizes economic
growth, because income inequality has worsened and the environmental
cost of climate change is positively associated with income growth (UNDP,
2011, p. 25). These observations are consistent with the substantial argu-
ments in the literature on the limits to growth (for example, Jackson, 2009;
Meadows et al., 1972).
The question as to whether present lifestyles are acceptable was already
raised in the 1994 HDR, which claims that ‘a major restructuring of the
world’s income and consumption patterns may be a necessary precondition
for any viable strategy of sustainable development’ (UNDP, 1994, p. 19).
The HDR 1998 similarly states that the environmentally damaging consump-
tion of some harms the well-being of others (UNDP, 1998, p. 47). Indeed,
the HDR 2011 scrutinizes consumption patterns in the very high HDI
countries: today’s atmospheric GHG concentrations are largely the accumu-
lation of developed countries’ past emissions, and people in very high HDI
countries still account for many times the emissions of people in the least
developed countries (UNDP, 2011, pp. 32–33).
On the other hand, however, the HDC approach also acknowledges the
instrumental value of income: income growth can be ‘very important as [a]
means to expanding the freedoms enjoyed by the members of the society’
(Sen, 1999, p. 3; original emphasis). The HDI includes the income dimension
as a proxy for a decent standard of living, as a surrogate for all human choices
that are not reflected in the health and education dimensions (UNDP, 2000,
p. 17). The importance of the income dimension is nuanced in the current
computation by taking the geometrical average of the HDI’s three dimensions
to limit substitutability between them, and by using the natural logarithmic
adjustment of real income per capita in order to reflect the assumption that
the transformation of income into well-being diminishes with increasing
income (UNDP, 2010, p. 216). Yet this methodology retains economic
growth as a prominent indicator of a country’s development, even when
the observed income level rises above what might be called a decent standard
of living. Indeed, the 2010 HDR admits that ‘countries became top performers
on the HDI through two broad routes: fast income growth or exceptional pro-
gress in health and education’ (2010, p. 46). Despite the critical consider-
ations mentioned above, the development and material wealth levels of
these top performers remain the normative goal of development. ‘Very High
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Human Development’ appears to take precedence over its consequences,
including sustainability (Crabtree, 2013).
Including economic growth unqualifiedly as an intrinsic part of the devel-
opment model is morally questionable in view of the requirements of environ-
mental sustainability. Given the biophysical constraints of the ecosphere, the
development model and GHG emission levels of the very high HDI countries
cannot be transferred to the rest of the world (Sachs and Santarius, 2007,
p. 151). Nonetheless, developing countries’ development is structured to
follow their unsustainable path: emissions in the developing countries have
doubled in the last two decades, accounting for most of the global emissions
growth (Peters et al., 2011, p. 8903). Climate change thus challenges the defi-
nition of human development as the expansion of people’s substantive free-
doms, when the latter are conceptualized simpliciter and presuppose the
possibility of infinite material progress.
The 2011 HDR distinguishes between three categories of environmental
risk factors (UNDP, 2011, p. 27). First, risks with an immediate impact on
households (e.g. poor water quality and sanitation) decline as the HDI rises.
Second, risks with community effects (e.g. urban air pollution) follow the
Environmental Kuznets Curve: they first worsen as the HDI rises and later
improve. Finally, and in contrast, environmental risk factors with global
effects (e.g. GHG emissions) continue to increase with a rising HDI. Hence,
in the case of climate change, calling for more human development in the
form of the expansion of freedoms simpliciter is insufficient to abate the
threat. Nonetheless, Anand and Sen insist that human development is not
only intrinsically important in enhancing current people’s capabilities, but
also instrumentally important ‘in increasing their “human capital” with
lasting influence in the future’ (1994, pp. 32–33). Hence, they consider
human development to be a major contribution to sustainability. Essentially
following this reasoning, the 2011 HDR, for example, supports community
management of environmental resources as an alternative to centralized
control (UNDP, 2011, p. 75). Although such initiatives represent needed
synergies between equity and sustainability, in view of the adverse effects
of global environmental threats—such as climate change—on the living con-
ditions of especially future people (see the third section below), there is also a
strong moral reason to constrain the appropriative material demands on the
global environment, especially by the worldwide consumption elites (Sachs
and Santarius, 2007, p. 153). However, the 2011 HDR still does not include
environmental sustainability in the calculations of the HDI,5 although the
HDI is exactly the headline indicator: ‘the figure that impacts most on those
that read each HDR, and especially so given the presentation of the results
as a league table of attainment’ (Morse, 2003, p. 192). ‘Greening’ the HDI
would provide a more nuanced account of human development and have a
greater impact on development policies (see, for example, Morse, 2003; Neu-
mayer, 2010).
The 2011 HDR defines SHD as ‘the expansion of the substantive freedoms
of people today while making reasonable efforts to avoid seriously
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compromising those of future generations’ (UNDP, 2011, p. 18). This defi-
nition is normative: only the sustainability of states of events that expand sub-
stantive freedoms is sought for. For example, regarding energy policy, the
2011 HDR argues that ‘equitable and sustainable development requires
making energy available for all, controlling emissions and shifting to new
and cleaner energy sources’ (2011, p. 67). As much as this is true, problems
arise when the 2011 HDR focuses on ‘greening’ the production of energy
and devalues measures to reduce energy consumption (e.g. price incentives;
2011, pp. 67–70, see especially table 4.1). Hence, it clearly favours efficiency
measures at the production side because they do not conflict with the expan-
sion of freedoms, while reducing energy consumption potentially restricts
individual freedoms.
However, a sensible strategy to tackle climate change must address both
aspects. A one-sided focus on production efficiency is flawed, because decou-
pling—lowering the carbon intensity of production—is a vital, but far from
convincing, strategy to achieve sustainability: improvements in production
efficiency have been negated by total consumption growth, resulting in a con-
tinued increase of GHG emissions (Jackson, 2009, p. 67; Mont and Plepys,
2008, p. 531; Ross, 2009, pp. 35 and 51). Moreover, there is a growth in
GHG emission transfers via international trade, which partially explains the
stabilization of emission rates in the developed countries and the steep
increase in developing countries (Peters et al., 2011, p. 8903). Reducing pat-
terns and levels of material consumption in the developed countries is a vital
strategy for attaining sustainability, but the clash between these distributional
issues and consumer sovereignty principles (Mont and Plepys, 2008, p. 531;
UNDP, 1998, p. 86) explains the reluctance of the HDC approach to
thoroughly scrutinize luxury consumption.
In our view, these ambiguities are a logical consequence of a theoretical
framework that identifies human development with the expansion of people’s
freedoms simpliciter. According to Sen, human development reasoning and
the social choice theory at its basis are ‘firmly tied to asking “comparative”
questions: how can we advance justice or reduce injustice in the world?’
(2008, p. 337). In contrast with Rawls’s transcendental approach—which
focuses on the identification of fully just institutions—Sen argues that we
should concentrate on ranking alternative social arrangements (2006,
p. 216; 2009, pp. 101–102). Advancing justice or reducing manifest injustices
in a society, ‘demands comparative judgments about justice, for which the
identification of fully just social arrangements is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient’ (2006, p. 217). Although we are sympathetic to Sen’s concerns, this
approach at least gives the impression that the expansion of freedoms—sim-
pliciter—could proceed ad libitum (Crabtree, 2010, p. 163) and lacks an
account of justifiable restrictions on freedom (see below). Indeed, the 1990
HDR argues that human development is a process of enlarging people’s
choices that in principle ‘can be infinite and change over time’ (UNDP,
1990, p. 10, box 1.1; emphasis added). This conception is particularly ques-
tionable in view of the risk that freedoms are used for unsustainable actions
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(Rauschmayer et al., 2011, p. 13). Indeed, ‘some freedoms and lifestyles (not
least those reliant on carbon based growth) that many people may value . . .
can have detrimental consequences for present and coming generations’
(Crabtree, 2010, p. 163).
This is not to say that the HDC approach underestimates the challenges
that climate change poses to our development models or depreciates the
requirements of sustainability. Our claim here is that these challenges
should figure more explicitly: the HDC approach would benefit from unam-
biguously rejecting the view of capabilities as ‘a set of disembodied freedoms’
(Jackson, 2009, p. 45). To be clear, we do not wish to deny people the right to
a decent standard of living; SHD can ignore neither the inequitable depri-
vation in the developing countries, nor the unsustainable consumption
levels in the developed countries. We do not reject the moral imperative of
expanding human freedoms, but SHD should explicitly acknowledge the bio-
physical constraints of the ecosphere. That is, a high quality of life ought to be
ensured while sustaining the carrying capacity of the ecosphere through
respecting its biophysical constraints.
In the following section, we will therefore draw on the existing literature
to advocate viewing capabilities within a triadic syntax, for this not only draws
attention to the expansion of people’s capabilities, but also to the necessity of
constraining human activities in order to prevent people’s actions from
causing illegitimate harm to others. The triadic syntax particularly applies
to climate change: since people’s lives and capabilities are dependent on
the environment, SHD should include constraining human activities in
order to prevent losses in future people’s well-being due to the aggravated
adverse effects of exacerbated climate change. On this basis, the fourth
section of this paper will sketch a framework that consists in enhancing capa-
bilities up to a threshold level, while constraining the functionings beyond
this threshold.
Capabilities and environmental dependency
Capabilities as triadic relations
MacCallum rejects the canonical distinction between negative and positive
freedom—most vividly described by Berlin (1969, pp. 121–122)—in favour
of a triadic conceptualization:
Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is
always freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference
with, or barrier to doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming
something. Such freedom is thus always of something (an agent or
agents), from something, to do, not do, become, or not become
something; it is a triadic relation. (MacCallum, 1967, p. 314; original
emphasis, footnote omitted)
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Arguably, this triadic syntax is implicitly acknowledged by the HDC
approach. For example, even though Sen has primarily focused on capability
sets—which has ‘the effect of taking note of the positive freedoms in a general
sense (the freedom “to do this,” or “to be that”) that a person has’ (1985,
p. 201)—he also recognizes both the instrumental and intrinsic importance
of negative freedoms (1985, p. 219; 1988, p. 275). Hence, capabilities can
be understood as an agent x, who is free from constraint y to achieve function-
ing z.
The HDC approach clearly illustrates that constraints to freedom can
arise from numerous sources (such as disability, illness, social conditions
and institutional arrangements), but the notion of freedom particularly
draws attention to cases where the presence of an obstacle can be attributed
to the action of another human being (Miller, 1983, p. 68). Indeed, people’s
choices are deeply interconnected and can have important consequences
upon other people’s lives, including the barriers x2’s actions can impose to
the capabilities of x1, and which may lead to losses in the well-being of x1
(Deneulin, 2002, p. 507).
Hence, considering capabilities within the triadic syntax not only brings
the freedom from constraints to the foreground, but also includes the neces-
sity of constraining people’s freedom in order to prevent illegitimate interfer-
ence that reduces another person’s well-being. Deneulin argues that a
capability theorist who emphasizes the crucial role of freedom as a com-
ponent of human well-being should recognize policy interventions that
restrain individual freedoms for the greatest well-being of all (2002, p. 507).
In the liberal political tradition, such form of paternalistic intervention can
be justified with reference to Mill’s harm principle (Deneulin, 2002, p. 510;
Nussbaum, 2000, p. 53)—that is, ‘the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others’ (Mill, 2008, p. 14).
In sum, whereas the HDC approach can lead to conceptualizing human
development as expanding freedoms infinitely, viewing capabilities within
the triadic syntax entails that the imperative of enhancing people’s capabili-
ties also includes policy interventions that impose certain constraints, in
order to prevent their actions from causing harm to others and, thus, consists
in carefully balancing freedoms and constraints. In the following subsection,
this triadic syntax will be applied to the issue of climate change and our com-
mitments to future people.
Environmental dependency and commitments towards future people
The HDC approach recognizes that the quality of the natural environment and
the health of ecosystems are crucial for allowing people to lead the lives that
they value (Sen, 2010, p. 130; 2013; Nussbaum, 2011, p. 163; UNDP, 2011,
p. 14; Hirvilammi et al., 2013). To take account of this instrumental value of
nature to human life, Holland has proposed to add ‘“Sustainable Ecological
Capacity” as a meta-capability’, which involves the ability to live in the
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context of ecological conditions that can provide environmental assets that
enable people’s capabilities, now and in the future (2008a, p. 324). On this
basis, she develops an environmental justice threshold—in addition to Nuss-
baum’s threshold of social justice (see below)—which represents a level at
which ecological systems have the capacity that enables them to provide
the assets necessary to reach the threshold of social justice (2008a, p. 328).
As long as ecosystems have this capacity, the ecological conditions of
justice are met.
Since people’s capabilities and well-being are dependent on the environ-
ment, climate change clearly violates the universality of life claims to the capa-
bilities necessary to live a worthwhile life. Obviously, the freedom from the
adverse effects caused by exacerbated anthropogenic climate change is
central to reaching the environmental justice threshold.6 Indeed, unmitigated
climate change is projected to result in inter alia increasing the return period
and severity of extreme climate events (such as floods, droughts, and heat
waves), reduced water and food security, increased health risks, ecosystem
degradation and mass migration (Costello et al., 2009, pp. 1698–1699;
UNDP, 2007, pp. 27 and 30). These adverse effects are likely to prevent
future people from achieving the environmental justice threshold and thus,
to threaten their lives and capabilities (including health, shelter and
nourishment).
Expressed in the triadic syntax, the universality of life claims at least
requires that future people (x) are free from constraints imposed by the
adverse effects of exacerbated anthropogenic climate change (y) to be able
to live a worthwhile life (z). Although the identities of future individuals are
not yet determined and thus not knowable, as humans they will all be entitled
to human rights and capabilities (Shue, 2011, p. 293). Due to exacerbated
climate change, they will be even less able to reach the environmental
justice threshold, which is preconditional for social justice. Byers et al.
argue that ‘preventing dangerous climate change, therefore, must be seen
as a precondition for prosperity and a public good’ (2005, p. 1).
Sen generally acknowledges that capabilities entail responsibilities and
duties of others (2009, p. 372) and the 2010 HDR recognizes that the
reality of climate change requires a fundamental reshaping of people’s
behaviours and aspirations. However, the 2010 HDR (UNDP, 2010, p. 21)
and Nussbaum (2011, pp. 163–164) admit that the issue of our commit-
ment towards future people remains a challenge that has yet to be
tackled by the HDC approach. Although the HDC approach has highlighted
the interactions between social and economic development, intertemporal
justice and environmental concerns have often been left out of its scope
(Leßmann and Rauschmayer, 2013). Indeed, the assumption of sustainabil-
ity that ‘the current generation might have to restrict itself in some ways
(e.g. restrict its consumption) in order to ensure the preservation of the
opportunity for a full life for future generations’ has not yet been given pro-
found theoretical consideration in the HDC approach (Leßmann, 2011,
p. 50).
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Consistent with environmental sustainability, SHD thus also includes the
necessity of constraining human activities in order to prevent illegitimate
harms and losses in future people’s well-being due to exacerbated climate
change. Therefore, in the following section, we will advocate that the goals
of SHD should be constructed in accordance with a framework consisting
of capability thresholds and functioning constraints.
Thresholds and constraints in view of sustainability
As argued earlier, the comparative approach of Sen and the human develop-
ment paradigm might lead to identifying human development with expanding
people’s freedoms unrestrictedly, which is problematic in view of environ-
mental sustainability. Yet, the goals of SHD should be constructed both in
accordance with an idea of what social justice consists of and the require-
ments of environmental sustainability in view of intertemporal justice.
Capability thresholds
Based on the Aristotelian idea of truly human functioning and informed by the
idea of a life with human dignity, Nussbaum has introduced the idea of a
threshold level of each capability ‘beneath which it is held that truly human
functioning is not available to citizens; the social goal should be understood
in terms of getting citizens above this capability threshold’ (2006, p. 71).
This minimum account of social justice goes beyond Sen’s
merely comparative use of the capability space to articulate an
account of how capabilities, together with the idea of a threshold
level of capabilities, can provide a basis for central constitutional
principles that citizens have a right to demand from their govern-
ments. (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 12)
Although it is an incomplete account of justice (see below), Nussbaum’s
approach offers a more tangible basis than the comparative approach for
the construction of the social goals that should figure in SHD: ‘the structure
of social and political institutions should be chosen, at least in part, with a
view to promoting at least a threshold level of these human capabilities’ (Nuss-
baum, 2000, p. 75). Nussbaum distinguishes between capabilities closely
related with the idea of human dignity, and instrumental capabilities (2006,
pp. 292–293). While human dignity requires the equal protection of
dignity-securing capabilities (such as political and religious freedoms) for
everyone, in the case of instrumental capabilities (e.g. shelter and nutrition),
in contrast, ‘what seems appropriate is enough’ (2006, p. 293; original
emphasis). Although we would rather make the differentiation within capa-
bilities—that is, each capability requires that the corresponding social as
well as material conditions are satisfied—we agree that in order for people
to reach a capability threshold, social conditions should be secured equally,
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while material conditions should be provided sufficiently (see also Peeters,
2010; 2011, pp. 18–19).
GHG emissions obviously fall on the side of material conditions; hence, it
seems that they should be distributed sufficiently in order to guarantee the
capability thresholds. In this regard, Shue has argued that a moral differen-
tiation should be made between subsistence (or survival) and luxury emis-
sions (1993, p. 56). This account has been developed further by
Vanderheiden, whose modified equal shares model starts from the claim
that ‘all persons are entitled as a matter of basic rights to survival emissions,
or a level of emissions sufficient to allow for their basic human functioning’
(2008, p. 243).
However, Gardiner rightly claims that if some emissions are deemed
morally essential, then they may have to be guaranteed even if this leads to
an overall allocation above the scientific optimum (2004, p. 585). Moreover,
determining what counts as guaranteed minimum emission entitlements
(or, in our view, the threshold levels of capabilities) is a difficult matter,
both in theory and in practice (2004, p. 585). This also seems procedurally
odd, for proposals for an unequal—sufficientarian—distribution of emission
entitlements appear ‘to envisage that the climate change problem can be
resolved by appealing to some notion of social necessity that is independent
of, and not open to, moral assessment’ (2004, p. 586). Furthermore, both the
’subsistence emissions’ proposal and the idea of capability thresholds carry
the political risk that there is nothing to stop some people claiming that
almost any emission is essential to their way of life. Finally, it is hard to see
how any agreement could be reached on minimum emission entitlements
that does anything less than exhaust the maximum permissible on climatolo-
gical or intertemporal grounds.
The account of minimal social justice that takes capability thresholds as
its point of departure addresses these problems somewhat better. First, it is
important to note that GHG emissions merely represent the means in pursu-
ing the goals that people value: ‘carbon emissions should not be the object of a
human right because a decent human life does not inherently depend on
them’ (Hayward, 2007, p. 440). Rather than emphasizing the right to a
certain amount of emissions, each person is entitled to the capabilities up
to a certain threshold level, which does not hold that they are entitled to
the supply of a specific amount of particular resources. Moreover, the equal
per-capita proposal to distribute emission entitlements fails to take account
of the fact that emissions may play very different roles in people’s lives
(Gardiner, 2004, p. 584). Since the conversion of resources into the ability
to promote particular ends may vary from person to person, equality in the
holdings of resources can lead to serious inequalities in actual freedoms
(Sen, 1990, p. 115). The idea of capability thresholds emphasizes that material
conditions should be provided sufficiently in order to enable people to lead a
worthwhile life, and thus takes these interpersonal variations into account.
Second, obviously much depends on how the capability thresholds are
defined. Nussbaum contends that the precise determination of the thresholds
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is a matter for democratic debate in each nation, but that we should avoid spe-
cifying unrealistically high thresholds as well as setting the thresholds lower
than human dignity seems to require (2006, p. 402; 2011, pp. 41–42).
These debates should be inextricably connected to the fundamental moral
questions climate change poses concerning how we ought to live, what
kinds of societies we want, and how we should relate to the natural environ-
ment (Jamieson, 1992, p. 147). Hence, the notion of social necessity inherent
in the idea of capability thresholds—and people’s claims to emissions—must
be critically assessed in view of the scarcity of permissible GHG emissions. In
our view, these suggestions must guide the determination process of the
precise thresholds, which admittedly remains an issue that requires much
deeper consideration.
Third, the idea of ‘subsistence emissions’ relates to the historical speci-
ficity of political and economic conditions: the lack of affordable and sustain-
able alternative energy still renders many, or even most, people dependent on
fossil fuels for their subsistence (Hayward, 2007, pp. 440–441; Shue, 2011,
p. 307). However, as noted above, the focus on capability thresholds shows
the merely instrumental value of GHG emissions. As long as people are
locked in a situation of carbon dependency, they should be allowed to emit
the GHGs necessary to reach the threshold level. Obviously, however, the
requirements of environmental sustainability call for the urgent development
and supply of affordable alternative technologies, which enable people to
reach the threshold level with significantly less GHG emissions. Shifting the
focus to capability thresholds thus acknowledges the fact that people have
differential access to energy sources. In sum, individuals have valid claims
to emit the GHGs that are necessary for reaching the capability thresholds,
therefore the collective goal of SHD should be to secure the capability
thresholds for every person in an ecologically optimal way, appropriating as
little as possible of the total permissible GHG budget.
Functioning constraints
Nonetheless, the threshold framework does not deliver a complete account of
justice, since it says nothing about capabilities and functionings above the
thresholds (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 75). Opportunities are likely to result in cor-
responding functionings beyond the threshold, and these might be unsustain-
able. However, people are able to control (to some extent, at least) their
emissions (Vanderheiden, 2008, p. 178)—in particular, those that are not
necessary for reaching the threshold—and the lifestyles of individuals
clearly matter in the realization of sustainability (Spillemaekers et al., 2011,
p. 79).
Since Nussbaum’s account does not specify a way to regulate people’s
activities beyond the threshold, another mechanism should be applied in
order to address this individual responsibility for climate change mitigation.
That is, SHD should also include policy interventions that constrain people’s
activities beyond the threshold in terms of their fair share of the maximum
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permissible GHG budget in order to prevent losses in future people’s well-
being due to exacerbated climate change.
Therefore, consistent with the HDC approach’s emphasis on capabilities,
some have proposed to constrain people’s capabilities as a strategy for achiev-
ing sustainability. For example, Jackson argues that the concept of capabilities
should be carefully interpreted ‘as a range of “bounded capabilities” to live
well—within certain clearly defined limits’ (2009, p. 45). More elaborately,
Holland has proposed the idea of capability ceilings that establish maximum
levels of capability protection (2008b, p. 416). The purpose of capability ceil-
ings, she asserts, is ‘to limit the amount of resources that can be put to protect-
ing capabilities that are in conflict with each other’ (2008b, p. 416).
While our view is clearly informed by these proposals to restrict freedom,
we would advocate that the focus be shifted to functioning constraints,
because putting ceilings on capability protection seems counter-intuitive in
light of what a capability represents, namely: ‘the substantive freedom to
achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the
freedom to achieve various lifestyles)’ (Sen, 1999, p. 75). Moreover, Nussbaum
argues that the threshold of each capability should be set in view of the other
capabilities (2006, p. 402), thus implying that settling conflicts in the protec-
tion of different capabilities is an essential part of the determination of the
thresholds. Furthermore, since the thresholds require that material conditions
be provided merely sufficiently, the amount of resources that is allocated to
capability protection is already limited to what is deemed appropriate or suffi-
cient for a life with human dignity. Beyond the threshold, however, it is not
merely having a capability but the functionings derived from it that potentially
causes harm, through the impact these functionings have on the natural
environment (Peeters, 2010, 2011; Schultz et al., 2013). Therefore, it seems
more accurate to reformulate capability ceilings in terms of functioning con-
straints that restrain people from functioning in a way that would impose ille-
gitimate barriers to other people’s lives and capabilities. This reformulation
makes the discrepancy between people’s entitlements to capabilities and
the necessity of preventing them from illegitimately and harmfully interfering
with other people’s lives theoretically transparent. Moreover, this focus on
functionings can take account of the total lifecycle of resource use needed
for realizing well-being (Schultz et al., 2013).
A policy that implements functioning constraints admittedly reduces the
freedom of choice and, hence, restricts the capability space as well. That is,
‘some functionings may even be forestalled completely, particularly where
they rely heavily on material throughput’ (Jackson, 2009, p. 47), which evi-
dently also excludes the capabilities to achieve those functionings from
people’s capability set. Yet, in the case of other functionings, the material
throughput may be less heavy and, to the extent that GHG emitting activities
are ubiquitous in people’s lives, it is hard to focus on specific activities. In our
view, it seems appropriate to constrain an individual’s aggregate net appro-
priation of the maximum permissible GHG budget. Although it reduces the
freedom of choice as well, constraining people’s functioning combinations
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as a whole notably respects agency freedom. That is, people retain the
freedom as well as the responsibility of managing their limited environmental
resource budget according to their priorities and their particular conception
of the good life. Within the confines of a limited GHG emissions budget, a
person might, for example, decide to no longer undertake city trips by
plane in order to eat some meat—although the climatic equivalence of
these activities must clearly be decided on the basis of a scientific account.
Moreover, it is clear that, for example, energy-consuming activities beyond
the threshold might be more permissible the more they are powered by
non-fossil energy.
In our view, distributing the GHG emissions budget that remains after
securing the threshold on an equal per-capita basis seems to be the most
obvious and equitable solution. As mentioned above, it may be objected
that an egalitarian distribution does not take account of the interpersonal vari-
ations that govern the conversion of resources into ends. However, the pro-
vision of sufficient material conditions so as to enable everyone to reach
the capability thresholds partly accommodates for interpersonal variations.
Moreover, it might be questioned whether justice requires taking the interper-
sonal variations into account even beyond the threshold—concerning the
attainment of luxury.
A policy that implements functioning constraints seems appealing
because it focuses on the demand side and, hence, would reduce total con-
sumption—which is the most important strategy for achieving sustainability
(see above). It can also be instrumental in attaining consumption efficiency
(lowering the carbon intensity of products) since, under such a policy, produ-
cers would have to ‘green’ their production processes in order to remain com-
petitive. Both strategies are vital to mitigate climate change and thus for
protecting future people. Unfortunately, sustainability strategies are often
(perceived as) an obstacle to freedom (Rauschmayer et al., 2011, p. 13). Func-
tioning constraints indeed at first appear to contradict the moral imperative of
expanding people’s freedoms. However, constraining people’s materialist
consumption beyond what is necessary for reaching the capability thresholds
is likely to improve their capabilities; for example, through enhancing their
freedom from the barriers imposed by the damaging social logic of material-
ism and consumerism (such as consumer anxiety, work stress and lack of
time) as well as the freedom to enjoy other activities, including cultural and
political participation and social well-being (Jackson, 2009, pp. 100–102; Spil-
lemaekers et al., 2011, p. 77). Since the HDC approach recognizes these com-
ponents as essential to people’s quality of life, a sustainability strategy
involving functioning constraints would not be inconsistent with the focus
on expanding people’s freedoms, that is, if the concept is qualified.
Conclusion
We endorse the 2011 HDR’s focus on the integral links between equity and
sustainability, which is explicitly based on the universality of life claims.
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These elements are essential for a convincing account of SHD, but the 2011
HDR somewhat overemphasizes human development at the cost of sustain-
ability. Even though it criticizes the paradigm that identifies development
with economic growth for being neither sustainable nor equitable, income
remains a prominent dimension of development in the 2011 HDR, even
beyond what might be called a decent standard of living. However, since
rising GHG emission rates are associated with material progress, climate
change challenges the definition of human development as the expansion
of people’s freedoms simpliciter. SHD cannot ignore the unsustainability of
the material wealth of the global consumption elites, certainly not when it
is elevated to a key part of the development goal.
We have argued that the HDC approach would benefit from unambigu-
ously incorporating the interconnectedness of people and human depen-
dence on the natural environment: whereas the HDC approach might be
susceptible of endorsing the expansion of freedoms ad libitum, the
account we advocate envisages a more modest development path. Our propo-
sal starts from the view of capabilities as triadic relations between an agent,
constraints, and possible functionings. This view suggests that the goal of
development includes enhancing people’s capabilities up to the threshold
level as well as functioning constraints preventing people from imposing ille-
gitimate and harmful barriers to other people’s lives.
Since people’s capabilities and well-being are dependent on the environ-
ment, unmitigated climate change clearly violates intertemporal justice.
Expressed in the triadic syntax, the universality of life claims at least requires
ensuring that future people are free from constraints imposed by the adverse
effects of unmitigated anthropogenic climate change to enable them to live a
worthwhile life. This entails a strong moral reason for not transgressing the
biophysical constraints of the ecosphere.
On this basis, we have argued that the goals of SHD should be con-
structed in accordance with a framework consisting of capability thresholds
and functioning constraints. As regards social justice, the goal of SHD
should be to secure the capability thresholds for every person in an ecologi-
cally optimal way, emitting as little GHGs as possible. Moreover, building
upon the existing literature about capability ceilings, environmental sustain-
ability compels us to constrain people’s functionings beyond the threshold,
in terms of their total net GHG emissions.
In sum, we have proposed to interpret the goals of SHD more modestly
than the expansion of freedoms ad libitum, especially concerning material
freedoms: when material conditions are secured sufficiently, the focus of
SHD should shift to expanding people’s social freedoms as well as situating
well-being within the biophysical constraints of the ecosphere.
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Notes
1 Environmental sustainability is informed by a scientific account regarding the identification
and quantification of the biophysical constraints of the ecosphere (Ross, 2009, p. 45). Admit-
tedly, these issues are still subjects of scientific debate, and might ultimately depend on pol-
itical agreement. Yet it should be emphasized that there is a substantial body of scientific
evidence and a broad consensus regarding the existence of the biophysical constraints of
the ecosphere
2 Humanity has by now committed itself to a rise in global temperatures of at least 0.768C, and
substantial human costs can already be attributed to the resulting climate change (Costello
et al., 2009, pp. 1698 and 1700–1701). Moreover, the climate will continue to change for the
foreseeable future due to the accumulated GHGs and the inertia of the climate system, as a
result of which the effect of even the most stringent emissions reduction will take several
decades to become apparent as well (Fu¨ssel, 2007, p. 266). Hence, an equitable climate
regime should also comprise adaptation and compensation measures. Nonetheless, our
focus in this paper is only on the relevance of mitigation to SHD, since it is vital in order
not to exacerbate the adverse effects climate change will have on future people and to
reduce the root cause of the problem (see also the section ‘Environmental dependency
and commitments’ and Fu¨ssel, 2007, p. 265).
3 The climate change mitigation agenda merely focuses on one aspect of the Earth’s ecosys-
tem—the effect of increased GHG emissions on the climate—and this may not reflect
environmental sustainability in relation to other aspects of the ecosphere (Ross, 2009,
p. 44). Together with issues of justice towards the environment (as addressed, for
example, in biocentrist and ecocentric theories), these aspects fall beyond the scope of
this paper.
4 Although their development has diverged somewhat throughout the years, the capability
approach has provided the theoretical foundations of the human development paradigm
(Robeyns, 2005, p. 94). For clarity, we use one denominator to capture their commonalities.
5 The 2011 HDR provides data on a range of indicators of environmental sustainability (e.g.
ecological footprint, carbon dioxide emissions and biodiversity), but does not change the
HDI computation, so as to keep it as focused as possible (Morse, 2003, p. 192; UNDP,
1994, p. 91).
6 Since humanity has already committed itself to substantial global warming, it would be
utopian to claim that future people can possibly be free from the adverse impacts of anthro-
pogenic climate change. Nonetheless, it is clear that future people should at least be free
from the adverse effects of exacerbated climate change (exacerbated or unmitigated
being key here; see also note 2).
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